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legal and legislative issues

Legal Issues Surrounding
Christmas in Public Schools
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D., and Ralph D. Mawdsley, Ph.D., J.D.

The status of
holiday celebrations
in public schools is
a key issue related
to separation of
church and state.

A

s the United States becomes
increasingly religiously diverse,
surprisingly relatively little litigation has occurred over the celebration of religious holy days and holidays
in public schools. Although the Supreme
Court has addressed Christmas displays
on two occasions—in Lynch v. Donnelly
(1984) and County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union (1989)—neither
case directly concerned public schools.
The status of holiday celebrations in public schools is a key, if seasonal, issue in light
of the importance of religion in the lives of
many Americans, as educators seek to teach
students to appreciate diversity in all of its
manifestations, including religion.

Supreme Court Cases
As noted, neither of the Supreme Court’s
two cases on the constitutionality of Christmas displays in public settings directly
involved schools. Even so, both cases are
worthy of consideration because they shed
light on the Court’s thinking with regard to
religious holidays and related activities in
public schools.
Lynch v. Donnelly
In Lynch, citizens in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, challenged the inclusion of a crèche
in a Christmas display in a park in the city’s
shopping district that was owned by a nonprofit organization. The display, which had
been set up for at least 40 years, included a
Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s
sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree,
a variety of festive figures, the crèche, and a
banner proclaiming “Season’s Greetings.”
After the First Circuit affirmed that the
display violated the First Amendment, a
divided Supreme Court reversed in favor of
the city. The Court applied its standard test
from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), holding
asbointl.org

that including the crèche did not violate the
establishment clause because officials acted
with a secular purpose, it neither advanced
nor inhibited religion, and it had not created
excessive entanglement between religion and
government.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor announced a test that the
Court occasionally employs when reviewing establishment clause disputes. Under
that test, the actions of government officials
are constitutionally permissible as long as a
reasonable observer agrees that they do not
endorse a particular religion.
County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union
In Allegheny, residents challenged the
actions of government officials of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who permitted a
Roman Catholic organization to erect a
crèche in the county courthouse. That display, which included an angel bearing a religious banner, posted a sign indicating that
the scene was donated by the private group.
A second display, outside an office building that was jointly owned by the city and
county, consisted of a 45-foot Christmas
tree, an 18-foot menorah associated with
Hanukkah, and a sign bearing a message
that the city salutes liberty during the holiday season. The menorah was owned by
a Jewish religious organization, but it was
stored, erected, and taken down by the city.
After a federal trial court rejected the suit,
the Third Circuit reversed in the residents’
behalf and forbade officials from allowing
the displays because they had the impermissible effect of endorsing religion. On further
review, the Supreme Court—in a judgment
containing five different opinions—affirmed
that the first display violated the establishment clause. The Court ruled that insofar as
county officials associated themselves with
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the display and did not merely recognize Christmas as a cultural event,
their actions had the impermissible
effect of endorsing a Christian message. However, the Court allowed
the second display to remain because
it lacked a principle or primary
effect of advancing a specific religion as part of a larger seasonal
commemoration.

Lower Court Cases
Religious observances. The
Eighth Circuit upheld guidelines
developed by a school board in
South Dakota for use in connection
with religious observances, most
notably Christmas, and other holidays (Florey v. Sioux Falls School
District 1980a, 1980b). The guidelines permitted objective discussion
of religious and secular holidays. The
court reasoned that explanations of
historical and contemporary values
relating to holidays; short-term use
of religious symbols as examples
of religious heritages; and integration of music, art, literature, and
drama with religious themes could
be included in curricula as long as
they were presented objectively as a
traditional part of the cultural and
religious heritages of holidays.
In New Jersey, the federal trial
court, in Clever v. Cherry Hill
Township Board of Education
(1993), upheld a board policy
requiring the display of a school calendar in each elementary classroom
that allocated a square each for an
array of national, cultural, ethnic,
and religious holidays. The policy
permitted religious symbols such
as “a pictorial representation of a
nativity, the Ten Commandments, a
cross, a Star of David, a crescent, the
Hindu OM symbol, Buddha, Confucius, and Jesus Christ” (p. 933, n. 7).
Applying the second part of the
Lemon test, the court pointed out
that the policy eradicated feelings
of hostility that some non-Christian
children may experience “by looking at a symbol which represents
the religion of a great majority of
36

Americans” and allowed students
“to share the knowledge of other
religious heritage without feeling
threatened by them” (p. 940).
The Second Circuit upheld a
policy of the New York City Board
of Education that permitted seasonal
displays of a menorah along with a
star and crescent but not a manger
scene or crèche in Skoros v. City of
New York (2006, 2007). Declaring
that the first two displays, namely,
the menorah and star and crescent,
were wholly secular, whereas the
manger scene was not, the court
relied on the Lemon test in upholding its constitutionality, because it
had the secular purpose of promoting pluralism and respect for diversity, neither advanced nor inhibited
religion, and had not created excessive entanglement between religion
and government.

None of the litigation
on religious music in
schools directly involved
Christmas.
In Sechler v. State College Area
School District (2000), a youth pastor in Pennsylvania challenged a
“Winter Holiday” display at a public elementary school that included
a menorah, a Kwanzaa candelabra
and book about Kwanzaa, two
books about Hanukkah, and a volume on the comparative study of
holiday expressions; a banner hung
overhead read “Happy Holidays.” A
related program began with secular
songs and a parody of a Christian
hymn and included presentations on
Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. Educators
did nothing to encourage students
to participate in events dealing with
Christmas. A federal trial court
rejected the claim that the activities
violated the establishment clause
because they did not favor one religion over another.
Religious music. None of the litigation on religious music in schools
directly involved Christmas. The
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Third Circuit (Stratechuk v. Board
of Education, South Orange–Maplewood School District 2009, 2010),
Ninth Circuit (Nurre v. Whitehead
2009, 2010), and Tenth Circuit
(Bauchman v. West High School
1997, 1998), joined by a federal trial
court in Florida (S.D. v. St. Johns
County School District 2009) forbade the singing of songs mentioning God in public schools, whereas
the Fifth Circuit (Doe v. Duncanville
Independent School District 1995)
reached the opposite outcome.
Gift exchanges. In Walz ex rel.
v. Egg Harbor Township Board
of Education (2003, 2004), the
Third Circuit upheld the authority of school officials in New Jersey
to prohibit a kindergarten student
from distributing pencils and candy
canes in class during December
because they had religious messages
attached. According to the court,
school officials did not violate the
First Amendment because the student had no right to distribute the
items in the context of a curricular
activity.
In a case from Michigan, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed that a student in Michigan could not sell
pipe-cleaner candy cane Christmas
tree ornaments that he made as
part of a school project if they were
attached to religious cards promoting Jesus (Curry ex rel. Curry v.
Hensiner 2008). The court agreed
that the principal did not violate
the student’s free speech rights
because insofar as the activity was
school-sponsored, he had latitude
to restrict the child’s behavior. The
court viewed the principal’s actions
as acceptable, because they were reasonably related to the pedagogical
concern of neither offending other
students nor their parents while not
subjecting young children to unsolicited religious promotional messages
that might have conflicted with what
they were taught at home.
Conversely, in Westfield High
School L.I.F.E. Club v. City of
asbointl.org
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Westfield (2003), the federal trial
court in Massachusetts granted a
preliminary injunction preventing
officials from prohibiting members
of a religious club from distributing
candy canes with religious messages during noninstructional time
just before the start of the school’s
“Winter breaks.” The messages
attached to the candy canes contained Bible verses and exhortations
regarding religious beliefs. The court
ruled not only that the board’s policy against the distribution of noncurriculum-related material likely
violated free speech but also that the
students’ intended distribution of
candy canes did not represent board
sponsorship under the establishment
clause.

Reflections
The celebration of religious holidays
presents interrelated First Amendment religion and speech concerns.
To that end, the ensuing reflections
offer food for thought for school
business officials and other education leaders when dealing with
Christmas and other religious holy
days in public schools. Those issues
address whether educators can
permit celebrations of all religious
traditions that are part of holiday
seasons as long as all religions are
treated equally, can refuse to honor
all religious holidays, or can select
only specified religious traditions to
honor.
Those questions highlight the issue
of permissibility regarding religious
activities in public schools. Educators who wish to permit all religious
activities need show only that they
do not violate the establishment
clause, an approach that may allow
celebrating all religions. Although
one can argue that the Lemon test
applies only where there is a secular
counterpart, no such secular counterpart exists if only religions are
being accommodated.
Demonstrating constitutionality is
more difficult because Christmas not
only has religious symbols associated
asbointl.org

with it but may be better known
than holy days of other faiths. If
officials emphasize only Christmas
in December, they not only run the
risk under the establishment clause
of overlooking other faiths but may
emphasize the symbols of only one
or two religions.
Arguably, officials could create
public areas that might permit celebrants to display their own items.
Although the court permitted such
a display to remain in Sechler, it
is unclear whether officials could
permit displays of one celebration—such as Kwanzaa alone, which
includes religious dimensions but is
not a religious holiday per se—to the
exclusion of other faiths—such as
Christianity, as the Second Circuit
allowed in Skoros—and still satisfy
establishment clause scrutiny.
A second issue concerns the permissibility of religious activities
from the negative side, because to

the extent that the establishment
clause cannot mandate celebrations, officials generally can exclude
all religious displays. Although the
Supreme Court has been clear that
public school officials cannot display
hostility toward religion, it is unclear
whether evenhandedness in denying
access to all religions is constitutionally acceptable under the establishment clause.
That second question also demonstrates the permissibility of religious
activities from the negative side.
Insofar as the establishment clause
cannot mandate the inclusion of
religious celebrations in schools,
officials generally may exclude all
religious displays. Although the
Supreme Court has been clear that
boards and educators cannot demonstrate hostility toward religion, it
is unclear whether evenhandedness
in denying access to all religions is
judicially permissible.
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Classroom activities present special establishment clause concerns,
because public school teachers
cannot engage in in-class religious
activities, use religious music without curricular connections, or post
religious themes. At the same time,
although teachers cannot restrict
what students do or read privately,
they can limit the expressive religious activities of children in classroom settings. Accordingly, activities
can be placed on a continuum from
those that can probably survive judicial scrutiny through those that are
likely to be prohibited.
At one end of the spectrum are
activities that should pass judicial
muster. Consistent with the federal
Equal Access Act (2014), a law that
allows student-organized prayer and
Bible study clubs to meet during
noninstructional time if officials permit other student groups to do so,
educators probably cannot prevent
those clubs from having their own
celebrations. Moreover, if officials
allow other clubs to decorate wall
space, halls, or other parts of school
buildings during holiday seasons,
then they would unlikely be able
to deny religious clubs the same
opportunities.
Courts have allowed education
leaders to permit some acknowledgment of Christmas in schools,
albeit through secular symbols,
such as Christmas trees and Santa
Clauses that, at most, have attenuated relationships to the religious
dimensions of Christmas. Educators
should thus be able to allow secular
representations of the season, such
as secular Christmas carols and
religious carols, if they are mixed in
as parts of programs dealing with
songs celebrating other religious
traditions, such as the story of
Hanukkah, or are linked to legitimate curricular and pedagogical
goals, such as the study of music,
culture, and history.
Two other activities may be able
to survive litigation. First, educators
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probably can permit some form of
gift giving, such as “secret Santa”
exchanges. As is illustrated by two
of the three cases discussed earlier,
though, educators probably cannot
allow identifiably Christian gifts,
such as candy canes or pencils with
attached religious messages.
Second, displays of mangers or
religious art are trickier. Although
an argument can be made that such
items may be permissible as part of
larger displays, in order to avoid,
or survive, costly legal challenges,
displays cannot be presented as
overly Christian and would have to
emphasize the more secular aspects
of the season.
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At the other end of the spectrum,
educators cannot allow school-sponsored singing of religious Christmas
carols or the recitation of prayers in
assemblies or classes. Additionally,
educators should avoid placing manger scenes or displaying religious
objects and paintings in schools
because doing so will likely be struck
down as violating the establishment
clause and endorsing a particular
faith.

Conclusion
Christmas and other religious holidays are times of celebration for students, and others, in public schools.
Even so, educators must conduct
themselves within the boundaries
of the establishment clause insofar
as they can neither appear to sponsor nor endorse religion, nor can
they display hostility to religion
in public schools. Maintaining the
correct balance between the competing legal duties of safeguarding
religious freedom but not endorsing
one faith over another is a tricky
task indeed for school business officials and other education leaders in
the increasingly religiously diverse
American public schools.

N OV E M B E R 2 01 4 | S C H O O L B U S I N E S S A F F A I R S 

Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d
542 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524
U.S. 953 (1998).
Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Board
of Education, 838 F. Supp. 929 (D. N.J.
1993).
County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d
570 (6th Cir. 2008).
Doe v. Duncanville Independent School
District, 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 4071
et seq. (2014).
Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5,
619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980a), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980b).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1025
(2010).
S.D. v. St. Johns County School District,
632 F. Supp.2d 1085 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
Sechler v. State College Area School District, 121 F. Supp. 439 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d
1 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1205 (2007).
Stratechuk v. Board of Education, South
Orange–Maplewood School District, 587
F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131
U.S. 72 (2010).
Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education, 342 F.3d 271
(3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936
(2004).
Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club v.
City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp.2d 98 (D.
Mass. 2003).
Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D., vice chair
of ASBO’s Legal Aspects Committee,
is Joseph Panzer Chair of Education in
the School of Education and Health Sciences (SEHS), director of SEHS’s PhD
Program in Educational Leadership, and
adjunct professor in the School of Law
at the University of Dayton, Ohio. Email:
crusso1@udayton.edu
Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D., is
professor of law and Roslyn Z. Wolf
Professor of Education at Cleveland
State University, Cleveland, Ohio. Email:
ralph_d_mawdsley@yahoo.com

asbointl.org

